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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a decision of the district court, after a court trial, determining that the 
appellant failed to prove the establishment of an easement by prescription or easement by 
necessity for a road over and across some 18 various parcels of land, all now owned by the 
respondent. The parcels have been owned by various private and public owners in various 
combinations during the history of the parcels. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The appellant filed a complaint against respondent, seeking declaration of an easement by 
prescription or by necessity beginning at the City wastewater treatment plant and running west to 
the east side of the bridge at Rock Creek. Respondent denied the claims, and a court trial was 
held. The court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and entered judgment for the 
respondent. The appellant appeals that decision. 
C. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant owns real property situated in the Snake River Canyon west of Rock 
Creek. The respondent owns real property situated in the Snake River Canyon east of Rock 
Creek, known as the "Auger Falls" property. The respondent began acquiring the approximately 
27 parcels that make up its ownership beginning in around 1960 (wastewater treatment plant 
property) and ending in 2011 (acquisition of 4 separate BLM parcels). The parcels have been 
previously owned by various private and public owners in various combinations. Four of the 
parcels have always been owned by the public (BLM). There is a "road" beginning at the 
wastewater treatment plant that travels westerly across the entirety of the respondent's Auger 
Falls property, to a bridge across Rock Creek. The "road" is "basically a two-track single-car dirt 
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path that is very rough in the wild." R., P. 25, footnote 1. The road is rough, relatively 
unimproved, and is approximately twelve to sixteen feet wide, with no utilities. Sagebrush and 
large rock are found alongside the road. Tr. P.33, Ll. 2-4. There has been no significant 
maintenance or improvement of the road until acquired by the respondent. Tr. P. 33. Ll. 5-6. The 
entire length of the double track from the wastewater treatment plant up to Rock Creek is wild 
and unimproved. Tr. P. 112, Ll. 3-9. During the times that a locked gate blocked the road across 
the parcel at the wastewater treatment plant, the appellants and their predecessor's in interest (the 
Vries) were provided with a key to the gate. 
The appellant acknowledged at trial that there was no unity of title for purposes of 
establishing an easement by necessity. Tr. P. 12, Ll. 16-25, P. 13, Ll. 1-13. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the appellant proved by clear and convincing evidence the establishment of a 
prescriptive easement over and across the respondent's property for the statutory period 
exceeding 20 years, as alleged in Count Two, paragraph 7, of the Complaint. 
B. Whether the appellant proved by clear and convincing evidence continuous and 
uninterrupted use of the roadway for the statutory period exceeding 20 years, as alleged in Count 
Two, paragraph 7, of the Complaint. 
C. Whether the appellant proved by clear and convincing evidence that the use of the 
road was adverse and under claim of right for the statutory period exceeding 20 years, as alleged 
in Count Two, Paragraph 7, of the Complaint. 
D. Whether the Court properly admitted aerial photographs of the subject property, 
overlaid with property lines, prepared by a professional engineer familiar with the property. 
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E. Whether the Court had jurisdiction to make a determination on the appellant's claim 
of an easement across property owned by the respondent. 
V.ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
A district court's decision regarding a claim of a prescriptive easement involves entwined 
questions oflaw and fact. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997). On 
appeal, the Court will not set aside findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing 
LR.C.P. 52(a)). If a district court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, 
though conflicting, evidence, the Court will not disturb the findings. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 
at 679, 946 P.2d at 979. Furthermore, the Court shall give due regard to the district court's 
special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses who personally appeared before the 
court.ld. (citing LR.C.P. Rule 52(a)). 
B. THE APPELLANT FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT OVER AND 
ACROSS THE RESPONDENT'S PROPERTY FOR THE STATUTORY PERIOD 
EXCEEDING 20 YEARS, AS ALLEGED IN COUNT TWO, PARAGRAPH 7, OF THE 
COMPLAINT. 
With respect to the claim of prescriptive easement, the appellant's Complaint alleges: 
"7. Prior to the acquisition of the property by Defendants, (and continuing thereafter), the 
Plaintiff utilized the subject easement described on Exhibit C hereto openly and 
notoriously, continuously and interrupted, under the adverse claim of right, with actual or 
imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenementfor the statutory period 
exceeding 20 years." (Emphasis supplied). R. P. 8, Ll. 6-9. 
Idaho Code §5-203 was amended by the legislature in 2006 increasing the statutory 
period from five years to twenty years. The Complaint does not allege a date or year in which the 
adverse use of the road by the appellant or its predecessors-in-interest began. The Complaint 
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makes it absolutely clear that the claim of adverse use is during the 20-year time period when the 
2006 amendment of Idaho Code §5-203 was in effect. 
The appellant now argues for the first time on appeal that "the ope"ative time period in 
this case is prior to 1961, not after it." Appellant's Brief, P, 13. "In this case, by 1961 the rights 
of the Uries to cross that property, and utilize the subject roadway, had already been perfected 
... " Appellant's Brief, P. 14. The appellant asserts that the 20-year statutory period pled in the 
Complaint had ended by 1961, which means it would have been triggered before 1941. There 
was no testimony given or evidence provided regarding the use of the road prior to 1941. 
Although there was testimony given by Carl Urie that he lived on property west of Rock Creek 
beginning in around 1946, he was only 2 years old and had no personal knowledge about what 
was going on at the property. Tr., P. 44, Ll. 7-22. 
The appellant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a specific 20-year period 
of adverse use of the road, as pled in the Complaint. 
C. THE APPELLANT FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE CONTINUOUS AND UNINTERUPTED USE OF THE ROAD FOR THE 
STATUTORY PERIOD EXCEEDING 20 YEARS, AS ALLEGED IN COUNT TWO, 
PARAGRAPH 7, OF THE COMPLAINT. 
The appellant neither pled nor proved by clear and convincing evidence when any 20-
year period of continuous and uninterrupted use began. In particular, as noted by the trial court, 
there was no evidence of any activity related to the property owned by the appellant or its 
predecessors between 1986, when Carl Urie left the property, and 1992. 
D. THE APPELLANT FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE THAT THE USE OF THE ROAD WAS ADVERSE AND UNDER CLAIM 
OF RIGHT FOR THE STATUTORY PERIOD EXCEEDING 20 YEARS, AS ALLEGED 
IN COUNT TWO, PARAGRAPH 7, OF THE COMPLAINT. 
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The appellant failed to establish that its use of the road, and the use by its predecessors, 
was adverse and under a claim of right. Both Carl Urie and Lee Glaesmann testified the entire 
length of the road, from the wastewater treatment plant to the bridge at Rock Creek is wild and 
unimproved. This is obvious from the aerial views in the exhibits in 1950 (Defendant's Exhibit 
C) and currently (Defendant's Exhibits B-1 and B-2). Although the appellant argues, without any 
factual basis, that the property is "on the outskirts" of a city. In fact, the property is miles from 
the city, and runs for an additional approximately 5 miles away from the city, through 
completely unimproved sagebrush desert canyon land. Although the appellant argues that there 
may have been a dairy on one parcel at some time, no evidence was presented as to which parcel 
the dairy was located on, how long it existed, and whether the road ever traversed that parcel. 
Even if those facts had been established, it would only be relevant to that parcel, and none of 
other 26 parcels owned by the respondent. The trial court specifically found that the land 
surrounding the road is wild, unenclosed, and unimproved. R., P. 38, L. 7. 
The general rule fixing the presumption of adverse use is applicable to improved lands, 
and the lands cultivated and enclosed. However, when one claims an easement by prescription 
over wild or unenclosed lands of another, mere use of the way for the required time is not 
sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the use is adverse. Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513, 522, 
373 P. 2d 929,934 (Idaho 1962); Trunnell v. Ward, 86 Idaho 555, 560,389 P.2d 221, 223 (Idaho 
1962); ChristIe v. Scott, 110 Idaho 829, 831, 718 P.2d 1267,1269 (Ct.App.1986). 
The trial court in its Conclusions of Law found that the facts presented in this case are 
very similar to ChristIe, including the fact that it was unclear how and when the use of the road 
began, the fact that the claimant was provided with a key to a gate on the property, and the fact 
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that the road traverses property that is wild, unimproved, and unenclosed. Therefore, there is a 
presumption of permissiveness, and the claim of adverse use fails. 
E. THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, OVERLAID WITH PROPERTY LINES, PREPARED BY 
A PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER FAMILIAR WITH THE PROPERTY. 
The appellant objects to the admission of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, which are aerial 
photographs with the parcel property lines shown overlaying the photographs. They were 
prepared by Lee Glaesmann, who is a professional engineer, and a staff engineer with the City of 
Twin Falls. Tr., P. 97, Ll. 1-22. He testified that he was very familiar with the subject property, 
having worked with it since 2003. Tr., P. 98, Ll. 1-7.He testified regarding his use of the City's 
GIS (Geographic Information System). Tr., P. 101, Ll. 18-25, P. 102, Ll. 1-25, P. 103, LL 1-25. 
This testimony makes clear that the aerial photographs as well as the property line maps are 
public records and that the exhibits are simply two components of the City's GIS (public 
records) shown on a single document. IRE 803 permits the admission of public records unless 
the sources of the information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. No such 
showing has been made here. 
F. THE COURT HAD JUSRISDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION ON 
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF EASEMENT ACROSS PUBLICLY OWNED 
PROPERTY. 
Since 2002, all of the property currently owned by the respondent and across which the 
subject road runs (except one parcel acquired later) was owned by either the respondent, an 
Idaho municipal corporation, or the Bureau of Land Management, a federal agency. In Idaho, 
"no right to use public property for private purposes can be acquired by prescription of 
acquiescence against a municipality." Tyrolean Associates v. City of Ketchum, 100 Idaho 703, 
704,604 P.2d 717, 718 (1979). Similarly, prescriptive easement cannot be obtained over federal 
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government property. Us. v. Hunter, 236 F.Supp. 178, 179 (S.D. Cal. 1964) ("it is well-settled 
that no right by prescription may be obtained as against the Government"). 
The appellant cites 28 USC 1346(1) in asserting that the US District Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction of civil actions to quiet title to an interest in real property owned by the federal 
government. Since none of the property at issue in this case is owned by the federal government, 
the appellant's argument of no subject matter jurisdiction fails. 
G. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND NO EASEMENT BY 
NECESSITY. 
An easement by necessity requires (1) unity of ownership prior to division of the tract; 
(2) necessity of an easement at the time of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the 
easement. Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542,681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct.App. 
1984). The counsel for appellant acknowledged at trial that there was no unity of title for 
purposes of establishing an easement by necessity. Tr. P. 12, Ll. 16-25, P. 13, Ll. 1-13. After 
trial, the appellant now seeks to assert an easement by necessity over land owned by the 
respondent west of Rock Creek that was neither pled in the complaint nor contested at trial. The 
legal description of the claimed easement, contained in Exhibit "C" to the Complaint (R., P. 15), 
and the drawing of the easement shown on Plaintiff s Exhibit 17 A, terminates at the east side of 
the bridge at Rock Creek, as shown by the note on the drawing. In addition, and as found by the 
trial court, the appellant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence unity of title of the lots 
involved. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
F or the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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DATED THIS 4th day of March, 2014. 
WONDERLICH & WAKEFTELD 
Fritz A. Wonderlich 
Attorney for Respondent, City of Twin Falls 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the 4th day of March, 2014, I caused a true and correct 
copy ofthe RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be hand-delivered to the following person: 
STEVEN WUTHRICH 
Attorney at Law 
1011 Washington, 
Montpelier, ID 83254 
Fritz A. Wonderlich 
9 
